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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In vielen Branchen hängt der Erfolg und die Nachhaltigkeit der Unterneh- 
Introduction
In a number of industries, the success and sustainability of a new firm's business strategy is tied to its sequential decisions to enter multiple markets.
Prominent examples include fast food restaurants, supermarkets, banking and transportation services. In all these industries, firms face the key challenge to optimize the sequence of entries in a number of different marketstaking into account possible internal resource constraints and external barriers to entry -in order to operate profitably and to build-up a sustainable market presence. In designing such a sustainable entry pattern, a new entrant typically has to decide on the optimal mixture of two distinct entry strategies: entering existing markets and facing competition of incumbent firms and entering new markets which can be expected to contribute to the overall profitability and success of the company. Although numerous examples of failed low cost carriers assert that a cost advantage is not a sufficient condition for market success, JetBlue Airways is different. One frequently cited distinctive characteristic is its innovative business strategy that diverges from other low cost carriers in several important dimensions. In addition to relying on secondary airports, JetBlue Airways developed hub operations at New York's largest airport (JFK). Furthermore, the carrier offers high quality services including in-flight entertainment and pre-assigned leather seats, some featuring more legroom than what is found on traditional network carriers' aircraft. It has also signed code-share agreements with international carriers such as Lufthansa, Aer Lingus or Icelandair.
Last but not least, JetBlue Airways introduced long-haul services on a large scale and therefore brought 'low cost' competition to a type of routes formerly dominated by legacy network carriers.
Since the issue of sequential entry has been understudied in the empirical literature, we analyze the factors that have driven JetBlue's entry decisions, from inception to the end of 2009. Our data analysis uses duration analysis regression models, which have not previously been applied to airline entry studies, but which are a popular tool in survival analysis literature. We find that JetBlue consistently avoided concentrated airports and targeted concentrated routes; network economies also affected entry positively. For non-stop entry into a route that has not been served on a non-stop basis before, our analysis reveals that the carrier focused on thicker routes and secondary airports, thereby avoiding direct confrontation with network carriers. Non-stop entry into existing non-stop markets, however, shows that JetBlue concentrated on longer-haul markets, avoided slot-restricted airports, and routes already operated by either other low cost carriers or network carriers under bankruptcy protection.
In addition to developing an understanding of the entry strategy of a successful low cost carrier, this study addresses the issue of the nature of entry barriers in the U.S. airline industry. Our findings point to airport dominance as a significant impediment to entry. We also find that the apparent entry deterrence effect of airport dominance is not limited to hubs or large airports.
Furthermore, airport dominance deters entry into both markets where incumbents are present and on new non-stop routes. This suggests that network carriers are able to use their airport dominance to prevent an entrant from establishing a network with a hub at a different airport. At the same time, JetBlue's reliance on secondary airports, along with some evidence that the airline avoided other low cost carriers, hints at the necessity for entrants into the airline industry to differentiate their product as much as possible.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a review of the literature on the determinants of entry into U.S. airline markets. The third section gives some background on the entry and growth of JetBlue Airways in the U.S. airline industry, followed by the presentation of our empirical analysis in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the key results and deriving important conclusions for both business strategy and public policy.
The determinants of entry into U.S. airline markets
An airline network is constructed by multiple market entry decisions. In determining these decisions, the airline management generally has to assess both the external attractiveness of the candidate markets -determined by potential customers, suppliers, competitors and partners -and the internal capabilities and resources of the company that determine its ability to compete in the respective candidate markets (see, e.g., Spulber, 2009, pp.433ff.) .
Although admittedly a simplification, this section condenses down market entry decisions to answers of the following two questions: 'Is entry profitable?' and 'Is entry possible?' With respect to the profitability question, it can be expected that current and expected profitability of a particular market typically is a key determinant in the decision to enter the market. In general, it is reasonable to assume that a profit-maximizing, risk-neutral firm will enter a market if the net present value of expected post-entry profits is greater than the sunk costs of entry. As post-entry profits depend on post-entry competition, the entry decision therefore is connected to the entrant's expectations about the conduct and performance of the firms after entry. Furthermore, the level of sunk costs incurred is a critical determinant of the entry decision (see e.g. Besanko et al., 1996, 396 ff.) . The higher the necessary sunk costs to enter an industry; the higher is the risk of entry, and the lower the expected profits. Additionally, the entry condition above clarifies that profits immediately after entry are not necessary for a rational entry decision. It is sufficient that, for instance, market growth expectations promise ample profits in the future. With respect to airline markets, this condition means that an entry decision must not be guided by the isolated profit expectations on the route actually entered, but typically has to take account of the revenue and profit contribution of the respective passengers over the entire network of the respective airline. Concerning entry sequence, routes which are expected to be most profitable should be entered first.
Although the expected profitability certainly is a key determinant of entry, empirical studies have regularly found evidence that abnormal profits are not competed away by entry but remain persistent for longer time periods (see Geroski (1995) for a general analysis; Joskow et al. (1994) for the U.S. airline industry). This finding suggests that an entrant also has to address the issue of the possible extent of entry into a particular market and implies that a positive net present value (which at least outweighs sunk costs) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for entry, as barriers to entry can reduce or even eliminate entry incentives. For the U.S. airline industry, commentators leave no doubt that several potentially significant (structural and/or strategic) barriers to entry have developed after deregulation. Given this general reasoning on the determinants of entry into airline markets, the existing empirical research can broadly be separated into two different strands. The first group of papers focuses on the estimation of structural models of entry decisions and consists of contributions by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) , Reiss and Spiller (1989) , Berry (1992) , Dunn (2008) , and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) . Reiss and Spiller (1989) incorporate both entry and price competition in a structural model, and investigate competition between differentiated direct and indirect services. They find that the indirect services are significantly more competitive if a direct competitor is also in the market. Dunn's (2008) study investigates the decision of an airline to offer high-quality non-stop service between cities, depending on whether or not the carrier also offers a lower quality one-stop service. Dunn finds that competition with rival one-stop service is an important determinant of non-stop entry (complementary to direct competition between non-stop entrants). The presence of a rival offering one-stop service in the market reduces the probability of entry suggesting that there is competition between one-stop and non-stop entry. Furthermore, Berry (1992) estimates a model of airline entry with heterogeneous firms and finds that an airline's market share on routes departing from a particular airport is an important determinant of entry into other routes from that airport. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) build on Berry's contribution but relax the assumption that entry affects the profitability of competing airlines symmetrically. They are able to show significant heterogeneity in competition between airlines.
The second group of empirical papers follow a reduced form approach.
These studies estimate the likelihood of entry as a function of firm and market characteristics. Starting with the contribution of Sinclair (1995) who focuses on the importance of hub-and-spoke networks for route entry and exit decisions, Boguslaski et al. (2004) estimate a model of city-pair entry for Southwest Airlines using data from 1990 to 2000. In addition to a quantification of the market characteristics which have influenced Southwest's entry decisions (such as especially high passenger density, short travel distances, low income areas, prior airport presence and high route concentration), the authors find evidence that Southwest's entry strategies have changed significantly throughout the decade. Furthermore, Morrison and Winston (1990) estimate probit entry models for several U.S. carriers before and after deregulation. They conclude that the airlines' activity at origin and destination airports is an important entry determinant. Finally, the study by Lederman and Januszewski (2003) estimates a reduced form model of entry into airport-pair markets. The authors assume that an airline starts operating a route as soon as the incremental profits -which depend on demand, cost and expected competitive characteristics of the route -from serving that route are positive. The model then explains entry as a function of the respective airline's own characteristics and the characteristics of all actual and potential competitors on the route. The probit estimations with a dataset for the U.S. domestic airline industry between 1996 and 2000 provide some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that low cost carriers may aim at expanding the variety of products in order to soften competition. Interestingly, Lederman and Januszewski (2003) conclude that in order to be successful, low cost carriers must either offer a differentiated product (i.e., enter new markets in the terminology of this paper), or alternatively provide products similar to existing ones but at lower prices (i.e., entry into existing markets in the terminology of this paper).
In a nutshell, the review of the existing literature has shown that probit models are often used to describe airline market entry. These models, however, do not take adequate account of the timing of entry decisions in general and do not study these decisions from the inception of a new entrant in particular. Applying an econometric technique, which allows taking account of the timing of entry (of a successful new entrant) is the distinguishing feature of this study. Although duration analysis models have not been applied to the airline industry, the model type has been used to study determinants of both firm entry (e.g. Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; Fuentelsaz and Gómez, 2006) and exit (e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Disney et al., 2003; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Shane and Foo, 1999 ) in a variety of industries.
Entry and growth of JetBlue Airways
Given the review of existing studies on the determinants of entry, this section narrows the view down to the entry and growth of one particular airline: JetBlue Airways. The unique position of JetBlue Airways as the only significant and successful entrant in the domestic U.S. airline industry in the last two decades justifies such a detailed investigation of its determinants. Before we present our econometric approach in Section 4 -which concentrates solely on the role of network construction in explaining the success of JetBlue Airways -this section aims at providing some general background information on the entry and growth of JetBlue Airways. In particular, after a brief general characterization in Section 3.1, the subsequent Section 3.2 focuses on the presentation and discussion of descriptive evidence on the entry pattern of this carrier. 
A brief characterization of JetBlue Airways

Patterns of entry by JetBlue Airways
Given the brief general characterization of JetBlue Airways as a rather atypical low cost carrier, this section narrows the focus down to the patterns of entry by JetBlue Airways. As a starting point for such a discussion, Figure 1 
Hypothesis development
We have identified three main categories of determinants of entry: route characteristics, airport characteristics, and demographic characteristics. In the following, we provide motivations for the respective variables in the three categories.
Route characteristics
Six different route-specific variables enter our empirical analysis: Distance, number of passengers, route HHI, LCC competition and Chapter 11. First, with respect to the distance variable, it was suggested by the descriptive analysis above that although LCCs traditionally focused on short-and mediumhaul markets, JetBlue's business strategy has a focus on long-haul routes. We therefore expect that entry becomes more likely with route distance. Second, route density was identified as a key determinant of LCC entry in previous studies such as Ito and Lee (2003) , basically because the revenue and profit opportunities are expected to be larger. We therefore expect that the likelihood of entry increases with the number of passengers traveling in a certain market. Third, a high route HHI suggests, other things equal, that competition on the respective route is less intensive and the respective market players might enjoy market power leading to higher fares and supracompetitive profits (see, e.g., Morrison and Winston, 1990) . Since the most profitable routes should be entered first, the higher a route's HHI the earlier JetBlue's entry should occur. Fourth, the route presence of another low cost carrier can be expected to reduce the profitability of entry as the respective carrier already serves a substantial fraction of the entire low cost carrier demand potential.
We therefore expect that the existence of other low cost carriers on a route hamper entry by JetBlue. Fifth, carriers flying under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection are often able to take advantage of this status to negotiate hardto-cut costs with employees, suppliers, and contractors and may therefore be able to reduce fares. Furthermore, as shown by Busse (2002) , airlines under financial strain are more likely to initiate price wars. Ceteris paribus, we therefore expect a reduced profitability of entry into routes which are also served by airlines under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection suggesting a negative relationship with entry activity on these routes. Sixth, although LCCs typically focus on point-to-point traffic, it was identified above that JetBlue focuses their operations on a hub and several focus cities. Exploiting network economies might therefore be of major relevance for JetBlue Airways. Ceteris paribus and given the results of previous research on airport dominance by Borenstein (1989) , we expect that network economies, as measured by the number of potential new one-stop connections, make entry more attractive in order to construct a sound network.
Airport characteristics
Four different airport-specific variables enter our empirical analysis: secondary airport, slot-restricted airport, airport HHI and passenger facility charge (PFC). First, with respect to the secondary airport variable, it is a well-documented observation that LCCs often use secondary airports as they have lower charges, allow for shorter turnover times and increase the likelihood of providing on-time flights (see, e.g., Ito and Lee, 2003) . We expect that JetBlue prefers entry on routes involving a secondary airport. Second, LCCs tend to avoid slot-restricted airports as they are expensive to use, have longer turnover times and increase the likelihood of delays. We expect entry for routes that involve a slot-restricted airport is less likely. Third, LCCs tend to avoid highly concentrated airports as the dominance of another carrier con-strains growth potential, might increase airport-specific operating costs and contains the risk of aggressive responses by the incumbent carrier (see, e.g., Hofer et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2002) . We expect that the probability of entry decreases for routes that involve a highly concentrated airport. Fourth, the higher the PFC, the less lucrative is market entry other things equal. We expect that entry occurs less often on routes that involve an airport with high PFCs.
Demographic characteristics
Three different demographic variables enter our empirical analysis: population, average weekly wage and unemployment rate. These variables are measured at the corresponding Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, and obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labour Statistics.
In regressions, we will use mean values for origin and destination airport's
MSAs as independent variables. The expected relationships between these variables and the hazard rate of entry are intuitive. Specifically, we expect higher population and higher weekly wage to be associated with a higher probability of entry, other things equal, as both these variables are measures of market size. Higher unemployment rate will be associated with a lower entry probability, due to lower expected demand.
The regression models
Analysis of network construction involves studying not only which routes the airline decides to serve with non-stop flights, but also at what point in time the entries take place. Investigating the timing of entry distinguishes our approach from previous studies on the determinants of market entry by low cost carriers (e.g. Boguslaski et al., 2004; Oliveira, 2008) . A convenient set of models which make it possible to account for the sequence of entry are duration models commonly used in survival analysis, but also suitable for entry analysis (see e.g. Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000) . These models explain either the hazard rate λ(t) of entry (hazard rate metric) or the time until entry takes place (accelerated failure-time metric). In the case of the hazard rate metric, the hazard rate can be understood as the probability of starting to serve a route directly within a short interval of time, conditional on not having entered that route up to the starting time of the interval (see Wooldridge, 2002) . Formally, the hazard rate for market i at time t is given by λ i (t) = lim
where T i denotes the duration between the foundation of JetBlue in the fourth quarter of 1999, and the quarter when the carrier entered market i.
To estimate the effect of certain time-constant x i and time-varying covariates z it on the hazard rate, we use a proportional hazard model, expressed
As the baseline hazard λ 0 (t) 14 is time-dependent, but not influenced by the covariates, each market has the same baseline hazard of entry. Therefore, comparing market i to market m, we obtain
, which is called hazard ratio.
From the hazard rate expression it is easy to see that for a binary covariate x k shifting from zero to one, the hazard ratio is
which gives the coefficients an easy interpretation. For a binary covariate x k shifting from zero to one, the hazard increases by exp(β k ) − 1. The same interpretation applies for a discrete change of a covariate by one unit. As a semi-parametric estimation method proposed by Cox (1972) imposes no restrictions on the shape of the baseline hazard and therefore allows the baseline hazard to be as flexible as possible, Cox regression is used for the analysis.
Unfortunately, hazard rates are not easily conceivable and less concrete than a corresponding time measure. With Cox regression, predicting actual failure times is not possible. In order to be able to give an estimate on how 14 The baseline hazard is the hazard rate of observations with zero covariates. The covariates shift the baseline hazard multiplicatively.
the covariates of interest influence the mean time to entry, we also apply a parametric, and thus more rigid, type of duration models. As Cleves et al. (2004) note, the use of the accelerated failure-time metric is justified if predicting the effects on failure time is desired. Duration models in accelerated time metric are written as
Exponentiated coefficients in accelerated failure-time models can be interpreted as time ratios for a change of a dummy variable from zero to one or a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. In other words, if the covariate x 1 increases by one unit, the predicted time of entry increases by exp(β 1 ) − 1. Dependent on the distribution of τ we can distinguish between several parametric models: the exponential model, the Weibull regression, the Gompertz regression, the log-normal regression, and the log-logistic regression. We choose among these five parametric models by comparing the values of the Akaike information criterion (AIC). According to AIC, the model with the lowest value of the AIC is preferred. In our case, it turns out that the data is best described when using either the log-logistic or the log-normal duration model. Results do not differ between these models and are presented for the log-logistic model. For comparison, results for the log-normal duration model can be found in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
For our empirical analysis, we combined data from several sources. In our regressions, we aim to explain network development. In addition to an analysis of the entire sample, we especially investigate a split of the sample into non-stop entries which result in a new non-stop connection (entry into new markets), and non-stop entries, which took place in markets which have been served directly by another carrier (entry into existing markets).
For entry into new markets we identified all routes which are only served via one-or two-stop connections.
We use traffic data from the U. Non-stop entry is explained by route, airport, and corresponding demographic characteristics. Distance is measured as the non-stop distance in 100 miles. Existing market demand is approximated by total number of passengers. As described in Section 4.1, we also account for market concentration (Route HHI ), low cost carrier competition (LCC comp.), possible advantages of carriers operating under Chapter 11 protection (Chapter 11 route) and possibilities of exploiting network economies (Netw. economies). With regard to airport characteristics, we include a dummy variable to indicate 15 The T-100 data set also includes traffic data for regional carriers who support the major airlines. Although most of these typically small carriers are legally independent, their economic existence is often tied to a large network carrier. For example, in many instances, regional carriers do not issue their own tickets but refer to the network carrier for all flight bookings. For our analysis, regional carriers are merged to the respective major carrier for which they operate on a specific route. 16 We cross-checked this methodology with information on route entries provided from JetBlue at http://www.jetblue.com/about/ourcompany/history.asp and it turned out that all entries were correctly identified. Given this detailed overview of the data, Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables included, while Table 4 in the Appendix summarizes the description of the variables, both for the entire sample, and for the two subsamples discussed above. 
Empirical Results
Our estimation results are presented in Table 2 for the Cox proportional hazard model and in Table 3 for the log-logistic duration model. We first report results for the entire sample; then we break the sample into cases of entry into new markets and entry into existing markets. The distinction between the two types of markets is simple: new markets correspond to airport pairs that had no non-stop service before entry of JetBlue (such as New York JFK -Long Beach route); whereas existing routes are markets where other airlines were present before JetBlue entered (such as New York JFK-Los Angeles (LAX) route). Out of the 124 entries covered by our data analysis, 45 were new entries, and 79 are classified as entries into existing routes.
As reported in Table 3 , the following four factors appear in all three regressions as robust predictors of JetBlue's entry decisions. First, JetBlue was more likely to enter more concentrated airport-pair routes. Holding other variables constant, the hazard rate of entry increases by about 1.7 percent if the route's HHI, as measured on a 0-100 scale, increases by 1 unit. As can be retrieved from the log-logistic regression in Table 3 , a one-unit increase in the route's HHI corresponds to an decrease in mean time to entry of 1.4 percent.
Thus, we find a large effect on the hazard of entry and its corresponding time to entry for a relative small increase in market concentration. However, this result is very intuitive -other things equal -as more concentrated markets are typically associated with higher profits, which invite entrants. Second, the carrier shied away from concentrated airports. Comparing the magnitudes of the two coefficients, we see that airport concentration appears as a strong entry deterrent. For instance, comparing the effect of a decrease in airport concentration 19 with that of an otherwise equal increase in route concentration 20 , we see that the former is considerably more likely to attract entry by JetBlue than the latter. The same result applies in the accelerated failuretime metric. While an one point increase in route HHI decreases the mean time to entry by 1.4 percent, a one point increase in each of the respective airport's HHIs increases the mean time to entry by 7.7 percent.
19 A one point decrease in the mean airport HHI, i.e. a one point increase at each of the two airports, increases the hazard of entry by 9.2 percent. 20 A one point increase in the route HHI increases the hazard by 1.7 percent. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses. Interval censoring is accounted for using the Efron approximation. Source: U.S. DOT T100 Market Segment Data, U.S. DOT DB1B Origin and Destination Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors' calculations. This finding is in line with Hofer et al. (2008) Last but not least, our results show the expected effects of demographic variables on entry, even though the corresponding coefficients are not always significant. Interestingly, comparing the coefficients of our income variable with the respective results reported in the study of Boguslaski et al. (2004) reveals substantial differences. While Southwest is found to target on highly price elastic passengers in low income cities with favorable operational conditions, our analysis for JetBlue fails to find such an effect. This result therefore supports out earlier observation that the business strategies (and customer groups) of both carriers differ significantly.
With respect to the implications of our results for entry barriers in the airline industry, we can say the following. First, the fact that JetBlue focused on secondary airports establishing new non-stop service indicates that it avoided direct confrontation with the network carriers. The other important finding is that JetBlue was more likely to enter routes if it was able to exploit network economies by increasing the number of connection flights.
Collectively, the two results imply that airport presence itself may be an important entry barrier, consistent with Berry (1990) and Borenstein (1989) .
Not only airport presence itself, but also the extent of this presence is a defining factor, as clearly evidenced by the relationship between airport HHI and likelihood of entry. As for the route-level entry barriers; the identity of your competitors apparently matters a lot. We find some evidence that JetBlue avoided routes, where it would have to compete with the low cost and currently financially distressed carriers. This suggests that the carrier evaluated the likely post-entry competition when making entry decisions.
Conclusion
In the last decade, the domestic U.S. airline industry has experienced a substantial consolidation trend. In addition to a number of high level mergers, These have not previously been applied to airline entry studies, but they are a popular tool in the survival analysis literature. We find that JetBlue consistently avoided concentrated airports and targeted concentrated routes; network economies also affected entry positively. For non-stop entry into a route that has not been served on a non-stop basis before, our analysis reveals that the carrier focused on thicker routes and secondary airports, thereby avoiding direct confrontation with network carriers. Non-stop entry into existing non-stop markets, however, shows that JetBlue concentrated on longer-haul markets, avoided slot-restricted airports, and routes already operated by either other low cost carriers or network carriers under bankruptcy protection.
Furthermore, airport dominance deters entry into both markets where incumbents are present and on new non-stop routes. This suggests that network carriers are able to use their airport dominance to prevent an entrant from establishing a network with a hub at a different airport. At the same time,
JetBlue's reliance on secondary airports, along with some evidence that the airline avoided other low cost carriers, hints at the necessity for entrants into the airline industry to differentiate their product as much as possible.
From a business strategy perspective, it can be concluded that successful entry into the U.S. airline industry is still possible as long as the respective entrant understands the key industry characteristics and growth needs and is able to position itself taking into account its relative strengths and weaknesses. The case of JetBlue Airways has especially shown that significant structural and strategic entry barriers can be overcome by a combination of entry into existing and new markets driven by an innovative general business strategy. Although entry into existing markets may yield higher revenues, entry into new markets has the key advantage of avoiding the costs of competing against incumbents and is therefore likely to contribute substantially to the overall profitability and success of the company.
From a public policy perspective, it is very likely that consumers gain substantially from the existence and growth of JetBlue Airways through significant reductions in fares -first and foremost on the airport-pair actually entered but also on adjacent city-pairs or on routes which face an elevated probability of entry by JetBlue Airways. In order to keep and further extend these benefits, antitrust authorities are not only well advised to monitor the industry to identify potential forms of anticompetitive behavior by incumbent firms but they should especially be skeptical with respect to any initiative of network carriers to acquire or merge with JetBlue Airways. Given the efficiency and significance of JetBlue, it is very likely that loosing this 'maverick firm' would cause substantial anticompetitive effects on many U.S. domestic routes.
Although the paper investigates the entry strategy of one particular firm in one particular industry, our results generally suggest that the art of successful firm entry in industries with multiple markets includes both facing competition by incumbents and exploring new markets. Although new firms are well advised to differentiate their products in order to reduce competitive pressure, successful and sustainable entry often cannot avoid overcoming entry barriers and competing with incumbents directly. Following the methodology of Paul Geroski (1991 Geroski ( , 1995 , industries which demand multiple entries in different markets therefore are a nice example for the importance of both imitative entry into existing markets and innovative entry into new markets.
Independent of an answer to the question which type of entry is more important for the company or social welfare, consumers will surely profit from both increases in competitive pressure and spirit of innovation. 
